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This paper examines two hypotheses: the firm governance structure influences union formation, and 
the presence of labour unions fosters long-term employment practices. 
 Results show that unionised firms have an average employee tenure 4.7 years longer than that of 
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Abegglen (1958) argued that Japanese employment practices consist of three components: long-term 
employment, seniority-based payment, and enterprise unions. This seminal work has since directed 
public attention to the distinctiveness of Japanese employment systems and has prompted much 
speculation about them. However, their reputation has not been constant over business cycles. In 
good business conditions, especially in the 1980s, they were praised as a driving force, enabling 
managers to have their own long-term managerial perspectives by enhancing labour relations. In 
contrast, after the bubble burst in the 1990s, they were severely criticised for producing inefficiency 
in the economy. Even today, their bad reputation remains almost unchanged although long-term 
employment is strongly supported by quite a few people.  
One major criticism is that employment practices restrict an increase in job opportunities for 
women or the elderly, now regarded as potential additions to the workforce essential for offsetting 
labour shortages caused by low birthrates and longevity. This may be because practices have 
historically been designed and implemented mainly for male, regular employees. At any rate, 
Japanese employment practices demand examination before they are significantly changed or 
replaced with other systems.  
In recent years, controversy around corporate governance reforms has renewed interest in 
employment practices. It has often been pointed out that the feature of Japan’s corporate governance 
known as cross-shareholding causes low profitability and fails to reflect shareholders’ concerns. In 
contrast, it has been recognised that such features of corporate governance in some ways 
complement Japanese employment practices. Aoki (1994) argues that there is some institutional 
complementarity between the main-bank system or cross-shareholdingboth of which are regarded 
as main features of Japanese firms’ governance structurewith Japan’s business and employment 
practices. He also argues that the practices enable managers of Japanese firms to have a long-term 
perspective: the governance structure’s stability from such features allows the firms to do without 
cutbacks and to continue their human resource development programs even when they are facing a 
downturn. Given this, we can assume that the recent corporate governance reforms, mainly intended 
for shareholders, influence current labour practices. However, there have been few studies that tried 
to examine this relationship quantitatively, although many scholars have pointed out its importance3. 
This paper examines the relationship between two components of Japanese employment systems, 
long-term employment and labour unions, in the context of the corporate governance structure. First, 
we examine the influences of the corporate governance structure on union formation. Next, we 
examine the influence of labour unions on long-term employment practices, as measured by average 
employee tenure. As for the relationship between features of corporate governance and labour unions, 
                                                  
3 Among the few studies, Abe (2002) examines the influences of shareholding by the ten largest shareholders and by financial 
institutions on the speed of employment adjustment in Japan. 
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Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that one of the reasons for the decline in the level of union 
density is managers’ hostile attitude toward labour unions. However, the question of what type of 
managers would be hostile to labour unions remains unsettled. We examine the type(s) of managers 
or shareholders that influence union formation.  
The framework of ‘Voice or Exit’ may lead to a better understanding of how long-term employment 
and union formation should be linked. On the basis of this framework, Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
verify the hypothesis that by complaining to a manager on behalf of union members (Voice), a 
labour union curbs employee turnover (Exit). Iverson and Currivan (2003) analyzes the influences of 
union participation and job satisfaction on turnover rate on the basis of the framework using the data 
on teachers in public schools. They conclude that both union participation and job satisfaction 
negatively affect turnover rate. We examine whether labour unions influence long-term employment 
by investigating whether curbing turnover raises the average tenure of employees. In this case, we 
have to consider the possibility that simultaneity occurs in the relationship between average 
employee tenure and union formation. We deal with such an endogeneity problem by using 
information on the features of corporate governance as instrument variables in our estimation.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We review the existing literature in Section 2. In Section 3, we 
describe the data used for our estimation and explain empirical strategy. In Section 4, we report the 
estimation results and discuss them. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Previous Studies 
Many studies have been made on Japanese employment practices from many points of view since 
Abegglen (1958) more than half a century ago. Hashimoto and Raisian (1995) and Clark and Ogawa 
(1992) characterise Japan’s long-term employment practices as a main feature of its labour market. 
Ono (2009) studies the prevalence of long-term employment in Japan and discovers that less than 
20% of all workers surveyed enjoy the benefit of an ‘implicit, long-term employment contract’. He 
also points out that Japan’s labour mobility has been lower than that of the U.S.: core workers are 
still protected by the long-term employment system although the proportion of core workers has 
declined. Shimizutani and Yokoyama (2009) examine Japan’s long-term employment system 
focusing on employee tenure. Using the publicly available survey data from 1990 to 2003 on wage 
structure from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure provided the Ministry of Health, Labour, and 
Welfare, they conclude that the impacts of employee attributes on average tenure have changed, 
given that average tenure increased in the 1990s, the period of economic depression. Ariga and 
Kambayashi (2009) study the popular theory that within periods of economic depression Japanese 
firms tend to hoard their workers as well as make wage adjustments; they study whether those 
practices changed in the 1990s. 
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Some recent studies focus on the relationship between features of corporate governance and 
Japanese employment practices. Jacoby et al(2005) show that corporate governance plays a key role 
in determining the HR executive’s role and the balance of power between various stakeholders using 
the data both of Japan and US firms. Abe and Hoshi (2007) examine whether the ownership of firms 
by financial institutions or foreign investors affects the introduction of such systems as 
seniority-based payment, performance-related wages, and irregular working hours. Abe and 
Shimizutani (2007) study whether the origin of firm managerspromoted from inside or invited 
from outsideis related to their employment practices. The results show that firms whose managers 
have been invited from the outside are more likely to conduct layoffs while firms whose managers 
have been promoted from the inside are likely to curb new hires, or to find it necessary to restructure. 
Urasaka and Noda (2001), and Noda (2007) reveal that the employment adjustment for firms whose 
managers are large shareholders (hereafter, owner-managed firms) is faster than for firms whose 
managers have been internally promoted. They then argue that this is because owner-managed firms 
are likely to put more importance on the benefits to shareholders and creditors than to employees.  
As for works examining the relationship between managers and unions, there are some previous 
studies, which focus on the influence of managers’ actions on unions’ behavior. Gatman et al(1976) 
argue with a popular belief that managers’ actions affect unions’ voting behavior and verify that even 
managers’ campaign against  unions’ sake has no significant effect on unions’ behavior. On the 
contrary, Dickens(1983) reveals that managers’ resistive actions have influences on unions’ behavior 
using the same dataset as Dickens(1983) uses. Freeman and Kleiner(1990) reveal managers’ 
resistance to unions’ decisions is a major determinant of the decline in unionization rate. 
Rebitzer(1994) shows that the decline in union participation rate is caused by  increased resistance 
of managers to unions in their firms who are afraid of being forced to accept pay raise by them. 
However, Matsuura and Noda (2013) is the only paper which focuses on the influence of corporate 
governance on union formation on the basis of our survey.  
In addition, there has been increased interest in family firms in the analyses of ownership structure 
and business conditions. According to Bertrand and Schoar (2006), advantages of owner-managed 
family firms are that the firms can have long-term perspectives, avoid suffering from the 
principal-agent problem, and provide opportunities for prospective successors to take part in 
management. They also point to disadvantages such as nepotism or difficulty responding to a new 
situation due to being tied to outdated conventions. Abe (2006) studies the relationship between 
corporate governance and personnel and human resource management systems using the data on 
listed Japanese family firms and owner-managed firms. Examining the hypothesis that family firms 
and owner-managed firms are likely to introduce the performance-based pay system, he reveals that 
family firms and owner-managed firms are less likely to have complaint processing systems for 
employees, verifying the hypothesis. Using data on Japanese medium-sized firms, Matsuura and 
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Noda (2013) reveal that firms with presidents long in office have a lower probability of having 
labour unions.  
  
 
3. Hypotheses, Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Our two hypotheses based on our literature review are as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Features of corporate governance influence union formation.  
    Hypothesis 2: Union formation raises average employee tenure. 
 
3.2. Data and Variables 
The sample consists of the firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (excluding 
those with the Nikkei industry code classifications for banking, insurance, and securities, and other 
credit companies and holding companies) in FY 20134. Our data is mainly from the Nikkei Telecom 
21 provided by Nihon Keizai Shimbun. Other data is obtained from the Nikkei Needs-Financial 
QUEST 2.0. The matched sample consists of 1,387 firms. 
In order to test the first hypothesis, we use five measures of corporate governance: (1) owner 
management, (2) management tenure, (3) foreign ownership, (4) financial institution ownership, and 
(5) ownership concentration, defined as the percentage of the firm’s combined common equity 
owned by the ten largest shareholders. 
First, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm is owner-managed. 
Owner-managers are said to be able to have long-term perspectives thanks to their stable positions. It 
may be that they seek better labour relations with employees, giving a favorable blessing to labour 
unions. On the contrary, it can be assumed that they would avoid labour unions because they regard 
those organisations as a potential threat to the freedom of their managerial decisions; some managers 
avoid intervention from outside stakeholders, known as entrenchment. In our study, we assume that 
an owner-manager is president of the firm. In addition, as Izumida (1998) does, we define a firm as 
owner-managed if its manager is one of the ten largest shareholders5. We create the dummy variable 
1 if a firm is an owner-managed and 0 if it is not. 
For management tenure, we predict both signs of the influence on union formation. Managers with 
long tenure may approve of labour unions as promoting long-term relationships, and otherwise may 
avoid them, fearing labour unions’ intervention. Using the data on Japanese small and medium-sized 
family firms, Noda and Matsuura (2013) find that longer tenure as a manager or a president is related 
to a lower probability of a firm being unionised. We define this variable as the time when a manager 
                                                  
4 We define FY 2013 as the period from March 2013 to February 2014, because we cannot obtain the data on firms that close the 
fiscal year in March 2014, which is ordinarily included in FY2013 when studying this issue.  
5 Izumida(1997) set several other standards to define an owner-managed firm. However owing to data limitation, we use only one. 
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begins to function as president to the closing date of the period studied. 
Ownership structure is also a key component of corporate governance. Using questionnaire data 
about who managers value more, employees or shareholders, Tanaka (2006) argues that although 
many still pay more attention to employees, they increasingly emphasise shareholders’ stakes, 
perhaps because they feel more pressure from shareholders. This implies that ownership structure 
also influences the formation of labour unions through changes in the relationship between managers 
and employees.  
Among various types of shareholders, we focus on ownership by two institutional investors: foreign 
investors and financial institutions. In general, foreign investors are assumed to place more 
importance on short-term profitability, unlike traditional Japanese shareholders. Thus, they are more 
likely to urge managers to exhibit profit-oriented behaviour in place of fostering long-term, 
harmonious labour relations. Thus, we assume that an increase in shareholding by foreign investors 
holds back union formation.  
In contrast, financial institutions such as banks and securities and insurance companies are assumed 
to attach more weight to long-term relationships with their customer companies, supporting 
managers in having long-term, harmonious labour relations. The institutional complementarity 
between factors for corporate governance stability, such as the main-bank system and stable labour 
relations also makes their actions mentioned above more reasonable. From this point, we assume that 
an increase in the rate of shareholding by financial institutions promote union formation. In addition, 
we add to these two factors the rate of shareholding by the 10 largest shareholders. We assume the 
higher this rate becomes, the more intention of a particular shareholder tends to be reflected to 
managerial decisions. However, this assumption may make opposite expectation of the influence. It 
is undetermined whether it supports union formation enabling managers to have long-term 
perspectives through making ownership structure more stable or it holds back unionization of firms 
pressing managers by boosting particular shareholders’ influence for seeking for profit. 
 As for the second hypothesis, few studies have been conducted although it has been pointed out 
that there is a complementarity between Japanese labor practices and firms’ corporate governance. 
However, Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that the existence of labor unions in firm is associated 
with their decreased turnover rate based on “Voice-Exit” framework. As for this mechanism, we 
have to point to the endogeneity problem; union formation of a firm is determined simultaneously 
with its turnover rate. In other words, other than the causal relationship mentioned in the hypothesis 
above, we have to consider the reverse causality between them. To overcome this, we introduce 
two-stage least-squares estimation. For this purpose, we utilize variables on features of corporate 
governance as instruments since we can hardly assume average tenure of employees a firm directly 
affects its turnover rate although longer tenure of employees may have some influence on union 




 To test our hypotheses, we use two-stage least-squares estimation 
   
  ܷܰܫܱܰ ൌ ߛ ൈ ܴܧܫܩܰ ൅ ߠ ൈ ܱܹܰܧܴ ൅ ݔߜ ൅ ߝ  ･･･  (1) 
    ܶܧܷܴܰܧ ൌ ߙ ൈ ܷܰܫܱܰ ൅ ݔߚ ൅ ߳′        ･･･(2) 
 
REIGN denotes tenure as president; OWNER as the dummy variable indicating 1 if a firm is an 
owner-managed firm and 0 if not; UNION as the dummy variable indicating 1 if a firm has a labour 
union or 0 if not; TENURE as average employee tenure; ݔ is a vector of component effects on 
dependent variables; and		ߝ and ߳′ are error terms.  
As the first step, we estimate Equation (1) to examine whether features of corporate governance 
influence union formation. As mentioned above, UNION is a binary explained variable. We assume 
union is a linear dummy variable6, and we use manager and owner as instruments. The results of the 
Sargan over-identification test show that among five variables produced for features of corporate 
governance, only two variables, manage and owner are appropriate for instruments. This implies that 
there is a possibility of reverse causality because the three remaining variables may change as 
managers’ attitudes toward long-term management influence investors’ decisions to purchase stocks. 
As the second step, we estimate Equation (2) to examine whether the existence of labour unions 
raises average employee tenure. The expected sign of ߛ and ߠ is both positive and negative. ߙ is 
expected to be positive based on the assumptions brought by the ‘Voice or Exit’ framework.  
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. TENURE for unionised firms is 16 years and for 
non-unionised firms is 10.3 years, about 6 years shorter. Although this seems to indicate that 
unionised firms prefer long-term employment to non-unionised firms, we have not controlled for 
attributes such as firms’ number of employees, age, or industry. Next, we examine our hypotheses 
considering these factors and the potential endogeneity between union formation and average 
employee tenure.    
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 3 lists the results of a probit estimation for Equation (1) using UNION as a dependent 
variable7.  
Column [1] shows OWNER is negatively significant; the marginal effect is that the probability of 
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biased estimators. 
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firms being unionised is lower by 12.3% for owner-managed firms. This result shows that 
owner-managers are likely to discourage unionisation. As noted, this is probably due to 
owner-managers’ hostile attitude toward labour unions. This result is consistent with those obtained 
in previous studies like Matsuura and Noda (2013): firms whose managers ascended as founders are 
less likely to be unionised. Another explanation for the result is the stronger power of 
owner-managers than of internally promoted managers. Owner-managers, in our definition, are those 
who occupy the position of large shareholders. This provides owner-managers with preferred 
positions to their counterparts in the managerial decision-making process. In that case, as Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) argue, there is a possibility that owner-managers consider the firms as their own as 
a result of ineffective monitoring by other stakeholders. Then, this free hand in management may 
urge owner-managers to pressure their employees into giving up unions. TENURE is not significant.  
 The differences in the influences of ownership variables are distinctive. First, FOREIGN is 
negatively significant and shows that a 1% increase in this rate decreases the probability of firms 
being unionised by 0.40%. Second, FINANCIAL is positively significant at the 10% significance 
level and shows that a 1% increase in this rate increases the probability of firms being unionised by 
0.42%. A 1% increase in 10 LARGEST significantly increases the same probability by 0.33%. The 
sign and magnitude of these three variables are based on the result of Column [1]. 
The result of FOREIGN suggests that an increase in foreign ownership boosts foreign shareholders’ 
influence over management. Owing to the profit-oriented stakeholders, managers are forced to put 
more emphasis on them and less on building stable labour relations. This results in inhibiting 
unionisation. The result of FINANCIAL suggests that increased institutional ownership allows 
managers of firms to apply long-term managerial perspectives without being bothered by impatient 
shareholders and thus to pursue better labour relations. In that case, managers are likely to recognise 
labour unions as a key factor for success and to approve their formation. The result of 10 LARGEST 
indicates that an increase in this rate enables managers to focus on keeping stable relations with large 
shareholders without taking care of the variation in shares among minority shareholders too much. 
As the case of financial institutions, managers are likely to appreciate labour unions. 
Table 4 lists the results of two-stage least-squares (2SLS) specification as well as ordinary 
least-squares estimation (OLS). As a result of Hansen’s J-test for over-identification, we show that 
among such instruments as the dummy variables for owner-manager firms, management tenure, and 
the rate of ownership by foreign shareholders, financial institutions, and the ten largest shareholders, 
only two dummy variables, for owner-managed firms and for management tenure, are appropriate 
instruments for our purpose. Second, we conduct the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity. As a result, 
the hypothesis that either of these two variables is endogenous is rejected at a 1% significance level. 
In addition, the fact that Cragg-Donald F-statistic obtained is 14.11 rejects the hypothesis that these 
variables are weak. 
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Table 4 lists the results using both OLS estimation and 2SLS estimation. Column [2] is the result of 
2SLS estimation. Column [2-1], the result of the first-stage estimation using UNION as a dependent 
variable, shows OWNER is negatively significant. This indicates that owner-managed firms are less 
likely to be unionised. Column [2-2], the second-stage estimation using TENURE as a dependent 
variable, shows UNION is positively significant. This result indicates that unionised firms are likely 
to have longer average employee tenure, in particular, approximately 4.7 years longer than 
non-unionised firms, controlling for other variables and dealing with potential endogeneity8. In 
addition, we conduct the same estimation as in Column [2] except we exclude industry dummies for 
the robustness check. The obtained result shown in Column [4] is almost the same as that in Column 
[2]. The impact of labour unions on average employee tenure stated above almost corresponds to the 
gap in average tenure between males and females9. Considering this, we can conclude that the 




In this paper, we establish and examine two hypotheses. The first is that features of corporate 
governance influence the formation of labour unions. As a result, we reveal that several features of 
corporate governance influence firms’ unionisation. In particular, owner-managed firms and firms 
with more foreign investment are less likely to be unionised. In contrast, more ownership by 
financial institutions or by the ten largest shareholders increases the probability of firms being 
unionised. Also, the obtained result shows that the existence of labour unions raises average 
employee tenure substantially. In other words, labour unions play an important role in maintaining 
Japanese long-term employment practices. 
In recent years, it has been proposed that the traditional Japanese corporate governance should be 
reformed as quickly as possible. However, as Aoki (1994) argues, features of corporate governance 
have some complementarity with employment practices. We show that this currently holds, shedding 
light on the mechanism of union formation and the influence of labour unions on average employee 
tenure. Thus, our obtained results indicate the possibility that recent reforms of corporate governance, 
which put more importance on shareholders’ interests, will cause significant changes in long-term 
employment practices, interfering with union formation. We should reform corporate governance in 
the context of Japanese employment practices, keeping in mind that they are inextricably linked. 
 
                                                  
8 The result of OLS estimation shown in Column [1] indicates the coefficient of union dummy is positively 
significant but is much smaller than that of 2SLS. In other words, there is underestimation. This is probably 
ascribable to failing to treat potential endogeneity between unionisation and average employee tenure, as stated. 
9 Shimizutani and Yokoyama(2009) reveal average tenure of regular employees from 15 to 65 years in private 
firms both for males and females using the data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure provided the Ministry of 
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Table1  Definitions of Variables  
variables definitions 
UNION Equals 1 if a firm has a labour union and 0 otherwise  
REIGN 
The length of years from when a manager of a firm started his or her 
career as a president to the latest closing date 
OWNER 
Equals 1 if a manager of a firm is included in the 10 largest 
shareholders and 0 otherwise 
DURATION 
The length of years from when a firm was found to the latest closing 
date 
FOREIGN 
The rate of the number of shareholdings by foreign investors to that 
of total stocks issued  
FINANCIAL 
The rate of the number of shareholdings by financial institutions to 
that of total stocks issued 
10 LARGEST 
The rate of the number of shareholdings by the 10 largest 
shareholders to that of total stocks issued 
AGE Average age of employees 
ROA The rate of current profits to total assets 
SALES Sales (in logarithm) 





Table2 Descriptive Statistics 
  Union Non-union 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
TENURE 1037 15.993 3.598 582 10.349 5.126 
ROA 1040 0.042 0.042 585 0.074 0.079 
AGE 1037 40.803 2.966 582 38.417 4.560 
SALES 1040 11.205 1.504 585 10.007 1.525 
EMPLOYEES 1040 6.906 1.371 585 5.796 1.414 
10 LARGEST 1024 0.126 0.332 573 0.469 0.500 
REIGN 1040 6.336 7.361 584 9.949 9.895 
FOREIGN 1040 0.139 0.120 585 0.132 0.134 
FINANCIAL 1040 0.254 0.114 585 0.165 0.097 
10 LARGEST 1040 0.435 0.147 585 0.504 0.151 
Manufacture 1040 0.639 0.480 585 0.285 0.452 
Construction 1040 0.055 0.228 585 0.058 0.234 
Wholesales 1040 0.140 0.348 585 0.232 0.423 
Services 1040 0.074 0.262 585 0.320 0.467 
Estate 1040 0.007 0.082 585 0.060 0.237 
Transport 1040 0.058 0.233 585 0.022 0.148 
Telecom 1040 0.007 0.082 585 0.015 0.123 
Energy 1040 0.015 0.123 585 0.000 0.000 





Table3 Probit Estimates of the Formation of Union 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
ROA -0.49 -0.666 -0.564 -0.567 -0.681 -0.626 
 [0.296]+ [0.290]* [0.300]+ [0.281]* [0.278]* [0.287]* 
AGE 0.025 0.023 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.026 
 [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** 
DURATION 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 
 [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** 
SALES 0.024 0.023 0.035 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 
 [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
EMPLOYEES 0.12 0.109 0.116 0.138 0.135 0.137 
 [0.023]** [0.024]** [0.023]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.020]** 
OWNER -0.123 -0.133  -0.11 -0.131  
 [0.047]** [0.046]**  [0.045]* [0.045]**  
REIGN -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001  
 [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002]  
FOREIGN -0.401  -0.388 -0.302  -0.289 
 [0.140]**  [0.142]** [0.129]*  [0.131]* 
FINANCIAL 0.421  0.481 0.588  0.646 
 [0.193]*  [0.186]** [0.173]**  [0.169]** 
10 LARGEST 0.327  0.336 0.34  0.355 
 [0.120]**  [0.119]** [0.114]**  [0.113]** 
Industry Dummy yes yes yes no no no 
Log Likelihood -522.28 -530.99 -529.68 -558.25 -568.39 -565.03 
Observations 1371 1371 1396 1387 1387 1412 




Table 4  OLS and IV Estimates of the Influence of Union on Tenure 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
 Dependent Variables   UNION TENURE   UNION TENURE 
UNION 1.165  4.735 1.491  4.312 
 [0.177]**  [1.398]** [0.181]**  [1.340]** 
ROA -7.01 -0.371 -5.502 -8.226 -0.391 -7.008 
 [1.201]** [0.182]* [1.480]** [1.241]** [0.182]* [1.459]** 
AGE 0.623 0.019 0.543 0.685 0.021 0.615 
 [0.023]** [0.003]** [0.040]** [0.023]** [0.003]** [0.041]** 
DURATION 0.036 0.005 0.016 0.047 0.006 0.027 
 [0.004]** [0.001]** [0.009]+ [0.004]** [0.001]** [0.010]** 
SALES 0.172 0.015 0.076 0.085 -0.01 0.09 
 [0.091]+ [0.014] [0.109] [0.082] [0.012] [0.089] 
EMPLOYEES 0.268 0.061 0.058 0.462 0.092 0.196 
 [0.102]** [0.015]** [0.142] [0.096]** [0.014]** [0.162] 
OWNER  -0.12   -0.133  
  [0.031]**   [0.032]**  
REIGN  -0.001   -0.001  
  [0.001]   [0.001]  
Industry Dummy yes yes no no 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic - 14.41** - 15.09** 
Wu-Hausman test - 8.58** - 5.31* 
Sargan test - 0.368 - 0.313 
Observations 1387 1387 1387 1387 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
